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Introduction 
The purpose of the paper is to describe a performance improvement project that 
implemented a standard sentinel event management model based on best practices and principles 
of high reliability organizations.  The project utilized define, measure, analyze, improve, and 
control (DMAIC) performance improvement methodology and Lewin’s Theory of Planned 
Change.  The project took place at an acute care hospital that is part of a not-for-profit healthcare 
system in Louisville, KY.   
It is estimated that one in four American families will be affected by preventable harm in 
healthcare, involving further medical care, disability or even death (Denham, Sullenberger, 
Quaid, & Nance, 2012).  Prevalence studies have estimated that between 3% and 16% of 
American patients experience preventable harm as a result of healthcare.  The Institute of 
Medicine estimates that over 100,000 preventable deaths occur from healthcare each year 
(Macrae, 2008).  The healthcare industry has improved its ability to identify harm related events; 
most of these events result in some type of formal investigation and analysis (Agency for 
Healthcare Quality and Research, 2010).  However, safety in healthcare will not improve until 
organizational learning from adverse events takes place (Macrae, 2008).     
Healthcare has examined other industries, such as aviation and chemical processing, for 
safety strategies.  This has led to widespread use of safety event reporting systems.  Macrae 
(2008) explains that when healthcare adopted safety event reporting systems, many of the 
essential participatory aspects were lost in the transfer.  Participation of the people closest to the 
work challenges deeply held assumptions about who holds relevant knowledge, who is 
considered an expert and who is both able to participate and responsible for participating in the 
risk mitigation (Macrae, 2008).  The traditional, hierarchical nature of healthcare organizational 
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structures makes participation in safety improvement more challenging (Roussel & Swansburg, 
2009).  Event identification and lessons learned should be disseminated throughout healthcare 
organizations to prevent future occurrences.  Learning from failures is a process that requires 
collaboration, decentralization and the ability to engage front line caregivers to fully understand 
the causes and successfully implement changes (Macrae, 2008).  
Learning from adverse events requires three types of responses.  The first response, 
identification, is the process of identifying adverse events and bringing them to the attention of 
others in the organization.  The second, analysis, refers to the process of analyzing the event with 
a focus on identifying system level failures and process breakdowns.  The third, change, refers to 
the way organizations implement corrective actions to reduce or eliminate reoccurrence of the 
adverse event (Ginsburg et al., 2009).  The most significant opportunities to improve 
organizational learning from adverse events may exist around participatory management and 
change management (Macrae, 2008). 
Review of Literature 
A search was conducted in the EBSCOhost database using the key words patient safety, 
medical harm, adverse event and sentinel event.  Filters included English language, peer 
reviewed and published in the last 10 years.  Duplicates were removed.  Relevant articles were 
selected based on information related to the current state and evidence-based solutions to close 
the clinical gap previously identified between best practices and the health system policies and 
processes.  Additional searches were conducted using the Google internet search engine relative 
to patient safety organizations, resources and regulation.  National and international 
recommendations and guidelines were identified.  Regulatory and accreditation standards were 
also identified for the United States.  Seminal literature on patient safety was included, regardless 
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of publication dates.  The literature was appraised using the Johns Hopkins Nursing Evidence – 
Based Practice model.  The evidence ranged from level IV to level V which are the lowest two 
evidence levels and generally consist of nationally recognized expert opinion and literature 
reviews.  The quality rating were A, high quality or B, good quality (Dearholt & Dang, 2012). 
Consistent themes for adverse event management fell into the three major categories of 
identification, analysis and change.  Gaps between organizational learning from failure in high 
reliability organizations, and organizational learning from adverse events in healthcare were 
identified in the literature.   
Current Guidelines and Recommendations for Management of Adverse Events 
Several national and international patient safety organizations have published guidelines 
or recommendations for adverse event management (see Table 1).  The guidelines are generally 
based on reviews of literature and expert opinion.  The majority of the guidelines focus on event 
identification, analysis and change.  Some guidelines include prevention and preparation as well 
as immediate crisis intervention.  Additional categories include disclosure of events, patient and 
family involvement, Just Culture principles and measures of the effectiveness of action plans.  
Organizational learning was identified as a theme in the guidelines (Bagian et al., 2015; Conway, 
Federico, Stewart & Campbell, 2011; Hoppes, Mitchell, Vendetti, & Bunting, 2012; National 
Center for Patient Safety, 2011; Taylor-Adams & Vincent, 2001; World Health Organization, 
2005). 
Identification. 
The identification response to adverse events includes recognizing an event has occurred, 
notifying the appropriate people about the event and launching the investigation to determine 
more information about what occurred.  A formalized team response should be planned for 
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adverse events.  Efforts should be made to increase the engagement of staff and leaders at all 
levels of the organization in safety improvement (Bagian et al., 2015; Hoppes et al., 2012).   
Systems should be developed to identify adverse events as early as possible and as often as 
possible.  Organizations have an opportunity to improve patient safety by performing equal 
investigations for all adverse events and near misses instead of just adverse events (Rivard, 
Rosen, & Carroll, 2006).  The timeliness of investigations should be monitored.  Additionally, 
the organization should consider a consistent role of the patient/family in the investigation 
process (Conway et al., 2011).  
 Analysis. 
The analysis response to adverse events involves careful review of the event and a 
systematic process to determine why and how the event occurred.  This includes identification of 
individual and system causal factors.  Processes should be developed for performing and 
reporting the results of aggregate reviews of adverse events and near misses.  This is consistent 
with high reliability organization principles and would provide the opportunity for more learning 
and prevention of future events (National Center for Patient Safety, 2011).  Formalization of 
analysis teams with training in root cause analysis methodology could make the analysis process 
more consistent and more effective.  Focused efforts to determine relevant contributing factors 
should occur (Bagian et al., 2015).  There are inconsistent recommendations regarding the 
participation of the caregivers directly involved in the event (Bagian et al., 2015; Conway et al., 
2011; National Center for Patient Safety, 2011).  The current process of inclusion has contributed 
to challenges in the analysis process. 
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Change. 
The change response to adverse events involves developing action items that are directly 
linked to the causal factors found in the analysis in order to prevent recurrence of the adverse 
event.  Action items should be specific, assigned to an owner, include a deadline and be tracked 
for completion (Bagian et al., 2015; Taylor-Adams & Vincent, 2001).  Considerable effort should 
be used to standardize processes to measure the completion and effectiveness of action items 
following an adverse event.  Metrics can be developed and routinely reported to display progress 
and demonstrate sustainable efforts to prevent future adverse events (Bagian et al., 2015; Hoppes 
et al., 2012).  The Board of Trustees and senior leaders should be accountable to overseeing the 
specific monitoring and improvement efforts (Conway et al., 2011).  
 There are key organizational learning strategies from high reliability organizations that 
should be considered for adverse event management.  High reliability organizations recognize 
the value of feedback loops and effective communication about safety reporting and safety 
related activities.  These communication channels can be formalized to further engage people at 
all organizational levels in safety reporting and associated activities.  Open communication about 
adverse event frequency, lessons learned and success stories should be shared within healthcare 
organizations.  Participatory management strategies from high reliability organizations can be 
utilized during adverse event management.  There is an opportunity to shift the hierarchical 
healthcare culture from deference to authority, to deference to expertise.  High reliability 
organizations consistently generate alerts, reports and stories from safety event reviews which 
are disseminated to everyone involved in the work (Ginsburg et al., 2009). 
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Clinical Practice Problem 
 Response to adverse events at this healthcare system was guided by system policy and 
procedure which was based on The Joint Commission sentinel event policy for hospitals.  The 
risk management department led investigations and cause analyses that were conducted on 
adverse events in conjunction with the leaders from the area involved, including the quality 
department.  Each hospital and the physician practice group had directors of risk management 
assigned.  These directors consistently followed the organization’s policies and procedures but 
there was variation in the tools and methodology used during this work.  Leaders felt the process 
was sometimes ineffective and did not always decrease the likelihood of recurrence.   
Leaders at the healthcare system expressed this process felt more like a regulatory 
requirement than a patient safety improvement strategy.  The staff and providers who were 
directly involved in the adverse event were present for the analysis and action plan.  This made 
some people feel it was a punitive process and sometimes resulted in defensiveness which 
distracted from the objective analysis of the event.  Leader engagement in the process was low in 
some areas and corrective actions were not always tracked for completion and monitored for 
effectiveness.  A clinical gap was identified between the healthcare system’s policy and 
procedure and the guidelines and best practices for patient safety event management found in the 
literature.   
The purpose of this performance improvement project was to implement a standard 
sentinel event management model in an acute care hospital that is part of a healthcare system, 
based on best practices and principles of high reliability organizations.   
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Methods  
The project utilized the DMAIC performance improvement model which was the 
standard improvement model in place at the healthcare system.  This model included five phases: 
define, measure, analyze, improve and control (Sokovic, Pavletic, & Pipan, 2010).  The project 
scope focused on sentinel events as they are the subcategory of adverse events that tend to be the 
most serious.  The project scope did not include the immediate medical response to the patient, 
disclosure to the patient or family, or claim or litigation management of the event.  Additional 
performance improvement work for individual sentinel events, such as falls with serious injuries, 
occurred at the hospital and unit level at the same time as this project.  Consideration was given 
to the overall healthcare system patient safety strategic plan when defining the scope of the 
project.  The current patient safety strategic plan spanned six years.  This project was considered 
to be foundational to future work, and the scope was chosen, based on the state of the culture of 
the organization at the time of the project. 
The DMAIC performance improvement model was team-based.  The DNP student, also 
referred to as the project leader, developed and led the performance improvement team to 
conduct this project.  The team consisted of a performance improvement coach, an executive 
sponsor, and representatives from key stakeholder groups.  These stakeholders included the 
patient safety reporting system administrator, directors of risk management, and leaders from the 
acute care hospital that had key roles in managing sentinel events.  Input from front line staff and 
medical staff was gathered during the define and improve phases.  The team leader was 
responsible for making sure the objectives of each DMAIC phase were met and the team 
remained within the project timeline.  The executive sponsor helped the team overcome barriers 
and maintained the project status as an organizational priority.  The performance improvement 
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coach assisted the team in selecting and utilizing the appropriate performance improvement tools 
to meet the project objectives.  The stakeholder group representatives ensured the work was 
accurate and feasible and helped champion the changes to the process among their peers, staff 
and providers.  
 One acute care hospital was identified to participate in the DMAIC performance 
improvement project.  The hospital was chosen based on multiple factors.  The leadership team 
was committed to patient safety improvement and had expressed a desire to improve this specific 
process.  They felt this project fit into the other activities that were underway.  Additionally, the 
large size of the hospital and the high level acuity of the patient population increased the 
likelihood of a patient safety event occurring during the project.  This was an important factor to 
consider because harm related patient safety events are low volume and there was a limited 
amount of time to pilot test the standard model during the performance improvement project. 
Define Phase 
 The project team was established during the define phase, including executive level 
support.  The team defined the problem and operational definitions were provided.  The project 
description, scope, goal and timeline were all agreed upon.  Performance improvement tools that 
were used during this phase of the project included the project charter, the Suppliers, Inputs, 
Process, Outputs, Customers (SIPOC), an affinity diagram of the voice of the customer, a project 
communication plan and project timeline (see Table 2).  The project charter clearly outlined the 
scope of the project and was used to secure the necessary support and resources as well as obtain 
key stakeholder support. 
 The review of literature and evidence appraisal had been conducted by the project team 
leader but this information was not presented to the team until a later phase.  Kurt Lewin’s 
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Theory of Planned Change was used with the performance improvement team.  Lewin’s theory 
includes three phases that support change within a system.  The first phase is called unfreezing 
and is essentially the preparation for the planned change.  The second phase is moving and 
requires both a detailed plan to test the change and engagement of the people involved in the 
change.  Lewin’s third phase is called freezing and this is where the new state is stabilized and 
becomes part of the culture to be sustained over time (Lewin, 1997).  Like most healthcare 
organizations, this healthcare system had a centralized and hierarchical organizational structure.  
This structure was identified as a potential restraining force to the project.  The project leader 
focused on participatory management strategies such as effective communication and 
engagement during the unfreezing and moving stages to help the team let go of the old process 
and make the necessary changes proposed by the project (Shirey, 2013). 
The stakeholders for the project included the Board of Trustees, with emphasis on the 
clinical quality and safety sub-committee, senior leaders, facility leaders, risk and quality 
directors, department leaders, frontline staff, patients, and patients’ families.  The project 
proposal was submitted to the Institutional Review Board and the health system for institutional 
approval.  Data collection and reporting during the project was done in compliance with all 
organizational, state and federal regulations.  The project leader was sensitive to the 
organizational policies related to external reporting of sentinel event information due to a lack of 
peer review privilege and tort reform in the state of Kentucky as well as Patient Safety 
Organization regulations.  
 The project was funded by the healthcare system and there were essentially no upfront 
costs associated with it.  There were 14 people on the performance improvement team including 
the team leader.  The project leader and team members were salary employees whose 
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participation in the project was supported by hospital and healthcare system leadership.  The 
project required time from the project leader, the project team members, the patient safety 
reporting system administrator, and time from in-house legal counsel.  The team held eight one 
hour meetings and one two hour meeting.  Occasionally, the team members were asked to do 
work outside of meeting time.  Meeting space was allocated by the hospital for the project.  
Approximately $200 was spent on the team celebration at the end of the project.  The estimated 
time dedicated to the project can be seen in Figure 1.  Development and implementation of the 
replication plan for the healthcare system was not included in the estimated project hours.   
 
 
Team Member      Estimated Project Hours 
 
Project leader         300 
Director of risk management     80 
Executive sponsor      25 
Average project team member     15 
Patient Safety Reporting System administrator time  20 
Risk management team education    6 
In-house legal counsel      5 
  
Figure 1.  Project Time Requirement.  The project required time of the project leader, director of risk 
management, executive sponsor, project team members, patient safety reporting system administrator 
and in-house legal counsel. 
 
Measure Phase 
The team developed a deep understanding of the current sentinel event management 
process during the measure phase of the project.  This was demonstrated using a process map.  
The team used an affinity diagram to identify barriers to the ideal sentinel event management 
process.  The project leader continued to use change theory during this phase.  Additional 
barriers to the implementation of a standard sentinel event management model were identified 
using Lewin’s force field analysis tool (see Figure 2).  Lewin’s theory states that the restraining 
forces cannot be removed but they can be countered by increasing the driving forces (Shirey, 
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2013).  The team reviewed available data on sentinel events to establish a baseline.  The 
healthcare system had not previously collected data regarding the management of sentinel events 
so there was limited information available in that area.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Force Field Analysis.  The force field analysis describes both the driving forces and the 
restraining forces of the change related to the project. 
 
Analyze Phase 
 During the analyze phase, the team identified opportunities for process improvement 
using a gap analysis.  The current policies and procedures were compared to the review of 
literature including the national and international guidelines.  During this comparison, the team 
identified the specific clinical gaps in each major category of event management (see Table 3).   
Improve Phase 
 The improve phase was the most time consuming phase of the project.  In this phase, the 
team designed the new sentinel event management model to be tested.  The clinical gaps 
identified from the literature were used to propose changes in the process for the model.  
Consideration was given to information learned during the earlier phases of the project.  The 
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team used a process map to establish the future state process for sentinel event management.  A 
toolkit was developed to support the new process to be tested at one acute care hospital.  See 
Table 4 for an outline of the standard sentinel event management model and associated toolkit. 
All team members provided input to the future state process and toolkit which helped support the 
change.  The team chose a timeframe for the pilot and developed communication and 
implementation plans for this phase.   Data were collected for the project evaluation and later 
used in the control phase.   
The standard sentinel event management model developed by the performance 
improvement team incorporated a planned, team response. The team consisted of an executive 
sponsor of the event, operational leaders of the area involved and the director of risk 
management.  Standard tools were used by the event management team to assist with the 
identification, analysis and change responses to the events.  The model utilized a series of three 
meetings. The first meeting was held as soon as possible and within 48-72 hours of identification 
of the event.  The goal of the this meeting was to gather the known facts, ensure the needs of the 
patient, family, staff and providers were being met, and plan any immediate risk mitigation.  The 
investigation of the event was planned and the people who were directly involved were identified 
for interviews.  The investigation and analysis of the event were conducted to determine what 
happened and begin to determine why and how it happened.  The team developed a flow chart 
time line and identified the individual and system factors that led to the event.   
The purpose of the second meeting was the analysis.  At this time, the team validated the 
findings of the investigation including what happened and why it happened.  The causal and 
contributing factors were identified and tested.  This meeting was attended by the core event 
management team and peer representatives of the clinical staff and providers who were directly 
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involved in the event.  Some attendees were assigned homework to review literature and 
professional practice standards to help the team develop corrective actions to try to prevent 
recurrence of a similar event.  Approximately two weeks later, the third meeting was held to 
facilitate change through the development of action items.  The actions developed were specific, 
measurable, included a deadline and were assigned to a specific person.  After the three meetings 
concluded, the director of risk management documented the work and produced an event 
summary sheet.  This sheet was used to provide follow up to the staff and providers who were 
directly involved in the event.  Additionally, the summary sheet was used to share the patient 
story within the facility and healthcare system for organizational learning. Lastly, metrics were 
developed to measure the use of the model to manage these events. 
The DMAIC tools used in the improve phase such as the implementation and 
communication plan helped the team transition through the change.  People affected by the 
change tend to be less resistant when the communication clearly establishes what is in it for them 
(Mitchell, 2013).  The team members were assigned to parts of the communication plan allowing 
them to champion the change to their peer leaders as well as the staff and providers at the 
hospital.  The pilot testing period lasted 3 months.  The project leader audited the sentinel events 
that were reported during this time using an audit tool developed by the team (see Table 5).  
Audit results were presented to the team at the end of the pilot testing period.  The team 
validated the audits and discussed the challenges faced during the pilot.  Lastly, the team 
members made recommendations to mitigate these challenges for greater long term success.  
These recommendations were also considered in the replication plan.   
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Pilot evaluation plan. 
 Process and outcome metrics were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the pilot and can 
be seen in Table 6.  The primary process metric was the percentage of sentinel events managed 
using the standard event management model.  An additional process metric was the percentage 
of event summary sheets completed for organizational learning.  Reports were obtained from the 
patient safety reporting system to determine the events that met criteria for the audit.  All sentinel 
events reported during the pilot testing period were audited. 
 The outcome measure was the number of reported sentinel events per 1,000 adjusted 
patient days for the acute care hospital.  This rate was not measured by the facility before this 
project.  Due to the change in the sentinel event definition by The Joint Commission on January 
1, 2015, the measurement began with 2015 data as the baseline and will be measured through the 
control plan.  The long term goal was to decrease the rate of sentinel events each year after 
implementation of the standard event management model.  See Table 7 for the project logic 
model which outlines the key resources, activities, metrics and the impact of the project. 
Control Phase 
 During the control phase, the team developed a control plan to monitor the process over 
the long term.  This plan included five metrics, some of which were measured during the project 
pilot (see Table 8).  Additionally, the team handed the process off to the appropriate hospital 
leaders to oversee the standard process after the project completion.  The team developed a 
replication plan to implement the process at other areas of the healthcare system (see Table 9). 
The team also held a celebration to recognize the team members and the positive impact the 
project achieved.   
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Results 
A report from the hospital's patient safety reporting system was used to identify sentinel 
events for the testing period.  Each event was audited retrospectively using the audit tool created 
by the performance improvement team to measure the project process metrics.  The audits were 
reviewed by the performance improvement team members to ensure the audits were accurate.  
Any disagreements were discussed until there was full agreement.  All sentinel events that were 
reported within the pilot testing period were managed using the standard event management 
model which met the project goal.  No events were managed using the old process.  Some events 
had all the steps completed during the testing period.  Each of these events had a sentinel event 
summary sheet completed and turned in which also met the project process metric goal.  For 
other events, the process was started but the management process was not able to be completed 
due to the time limitation of the pilot testing period.  One event was not classified as a sentinel 
event but there was a desire to perform a root cause analysis; therefore, the new model was used 
for that event as well.  This event was not included in the project audits since it was not a 
sentinel event.   
The number of sentinel events, percentage of events managed with the standard model 
and the percentage of events with completed sentinel event summary sheets were provided to the 
team for evaluation.  Although the toolkit was a helpful guide during the pilot, it was recognized 
that there were areas that needed further clarification and there were some key parts missing such 
as talking points for the executive sponsor, interviewing techniques, communication of 
homework assignments between the second and third meetings and guidance on implementing 
action items. 
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Discussion 
There was no way to control the volume of events or the type of events during the testing 
period.  However, the team was satisfied with the results and the opportunities to learn during the 
testing period.  Each event that was managed during the testing period was different which 
provided more learning opportunities for the team.  The risk director who facilitated the cause 
analysis meetings conducted an informal debrief of the executive sponsor and meeting 
participants at the end of most of the meetings.  This included the front line staff and providers in 
attendance.  This information was summarized and shared with the performance improvement 
team at the last team meeting.   
The performance improvement team believed the new model was more successful than the 
previous approach to adverse events.  During the pilot testing period, they felt the cause analysis 
team had a deeper understanding of what happened and why it happened which allowed them to 
link the corrective actions when using the new model.  The team believed that the new sentinel 
event management model would help the hospital be more likely to prevent a recurrence of a 
similar patient safety event.  At the beginning of the pilot, the team was concerned about how the 
frontline staff and providers would react to the people who were directly involved in the event 
not being included in the cause analysis meeting.  However, the informal feedback from those 
caregivers was overwhelmingly positive during the pilot.  For the most part, the interviews and 
investigations were thoroughly completed prior to the analysis allowing this transition to occur. 
The team also recognized that the team-based event management approach was more successful. 
Challenges 
During the pilot, the team faced challenges with meeting scheduling and coordination of 
the cause analysis meetings, timely access to the people directly involved in the event, and 
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education about the new process and cause analysis process in general.  Adjustments were made 
to the toolkit during the pilot to make it a more useful tool.  Small changes were made during the 
pilot to mitigate each of these challenges.  During the pilot evaluation, the team reviewed the 
challenges and made formal recommendations to address them in order to sustain the process. 
Limitations 
There was no way to control the volume of events, the time in between events or the type 
of events to be tested.  The volume of sentinel events was low which was expected by the team, 
but that did limit the opportunity to test all possible scenarios.  Despite the low volume, the team 
was satisfied with the learning opportunities that the pilot test provided and felt that it was 
successful enough to make recommendations for long term use.  
Recommendations 
Based on the results of the pilot test, the performance improvement team recommended 
this process be sustained at the acute care hospital and replicated to the rest of the healthcare 
system.  The team recommended some revisions to the toolkit.  These revisions were not related 
to the core process steps.  They provided additional clarification, instruction or made a tool 
easier to operationalize.  A replication plan was developed for the system risk management and 
patient safety leaders to deploy within the organization. 
Other healthcare systems who wish to implement an event management model should 
consider the use of standard improvement methodology and change management principles.  The 
structure provided by the DMAIC performance improvement methodology and Lewin’s Theory 
of Planned Change helped the team assess the culture at the hospital and determine what level of 
change they were ready for and what barriers may be faced during the change.  The standard 
model may not have been implemented successfully if it had been presented to the hospital by 
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the project leader only and not by the team members.  The team approach to the project and the 
pilot test of change before asking the leaders to commit to permanent change were keys to 
success that should be considered by other healthcare systems.  The pilot test of change provided 
the opportunity for team members to see the changes and how the model worked before making 
a long term commitment.  The pilot provided a comfort zone where the team members and 
stakeholders knew they would have the ability to provide input during the project evaluation and 
help influence the final process to be sustained and replicated.  The team members were able to 
serve as change champions to others within the hospital and help transition to the new sentinel 
event model.   
Conclusion 
High rates of medical harm and preventable deaths have been demonstrated around the 
world (Runciman & Moller, 2000).  Despite the international awareness and substantial efforts 
for improvement, little to no progress has been made in preventing harm to patients (Chassin, 
2013).  The response to adverse events in healthcare is the opportunity to learn what happened, 
why it happened and what may prevent a future occurrence of a similar event (Conway et al., 
2011).  Current adverse event management policies are heavily influenced by regulatory 
standards and litigation environments which may hinder prevention of future events (Hoppes et 
al., 2012).  Efforts have been made to compare the successful safety records of high reliability 
organizations to healthcare to demonstrate long term organizational change (Kalisch & 
Aebersold, 2006).   
The healthcare industry is experiencing unprecedented change and can no longer operate 
under the status quo.  Operating expenses are going up and reimbursements are going down.  
Healthcare organizations cannot afford to simply talk about patient safety improvement.  Internal 
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and external forces continue to add pressure for change that results in measureable improvement 
(Marshall, 2011).  This project demonstrated that the leadership team was ready to make changes 
to the sentinel event management process to improve patient safety.  The team remained engaged 
throughout the six month project and have committed to sustain the changes by utilizing the 
control plan.   
The performance improvement team recognized that they will need to remain focused in 
the areas that faced challenges during the pilot testing period such as meeting coordination, 
access to the people directly involved, and ongoing education regarding cause analysis.  The 
leaders now have a better understanding that the team-based event management model 
recommended in the literature can be more successful than the historical approach of risk 
management owning the process.  The lessons learned during this project, along with the team’s 
recommendations to mitigate the challenges, will be shared with the other areas of the healthcare 
system as they replicate the standard sentinel event management model.  This foundational work 
within the healthcare system’s patient safety strategic plan will contribute to the overall goal of 
eliminating preventable patient harm.  
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Table 1 




Systems Analysis of 
Clinical Incidents: 
The London Protocol 
WHO Draft Guidelines for 
Adverse Event Reporting 
and Learning Systems 
Serious Safety Events: 
Getting to Zero 
Patient Safety Handbook Respectful Management 
of Serious Clinical Events 
RCA2: Improving Root 
Cause Analysis and 







World Health Alliance (2005) Michelle Hoppes. Jacque L 
Mitchell, Ellen Grady 
Vendetti & Robert F. 
Bunting; American Society 
for Healthcare Risk 
Management (2012) 
National Center for Patient 
Safety: A part of the 
Veterans Health 
Administration (2011) 
Jim Conway, Frank 
Federico, Kevin Stewart & 
Mark J Campbell; Institute 
for Healthcare 
Improvement (2011) 





Level IV, B Level IV, B Level IV, B Level IV, A Level IV, A Level IV, A 
Setting and 
Audience 
Acute care, mental 
health, ambulances, 
primary care; use by 
risk managers or 
designated teams  
All healthcare organizations 
in the world interested in 
healthcare improvement 
All healthcare settings, risk 





All healthcare settings; 
healthcare executives and 
other leaders 
internationally 
All healthcare, facilities, 
patient safety professionals 
Theory/ 
Back-ground 
James Reason’s Model 
of Organizational 
Accidents 
Review of literature, expert 
opinion, surveys of countries 
with national reporting 
systems 
Eliminating preventable harm 
is a core value of the 
organization; this should be a 
competency of risk and 
patient safety professionals 
High Reliability 
Organizations learning from 
failures as a model 
Drawn from fields of 
patient and family centered 
care, patient safety, service 
recovery, crisis 
management and disaster 
planning 
Review of literature and 







Non-specific; use of 
the guidelines 
determined by the 
seriousness of the 
event 
Adverse Event: injury related 
to medical management, 
preventable or not 
Serious safety event: a 
deviation from generally 
acceptable practice or process 
that reaches the patient and 
causes severe harm or death 
Adverse Events: untoward 
incidents, therapeutic 
misadventures, iatrogenic 
injuries or other occurrences 
directly associated with care 
or services provided by 
VHA 
Serious clinical adverse 
event: for the most part 
preventable and results in 
permanent psychological 
or physical harm including 
death 
Adverse event: untoward 
incident, therapeutic 
misadventure, iatrogenic 
injury, or other occurrence 
of harm or potential harm 
directly associated with 
care or services provided 
Preparation 
& Planning 
Response team should 
be established 
Not addressed Advanced planning, credible 
leadership, formalized 




Plan & prepare: develop 
transparency, engage 
leaders, promote safety as 
a core value; use crisis 
management team; 
prioritize needs of patient, 
family and organization 
Risk based prioritization 
system to determine which 
events should have cause 
analysis; planned team 
response, leadership and 
board support, define 
blameworthy events not 
eligible for RCA 





Systems Analysis of 
Clinical Incidents: 
The London Protocol 
WHO Draft Guidelines for 
Adverse Event Reporting 
and Learning Systems 
Serious Safety Events: 
Getting to Zero 
Patient Safety Handbook Respectful Management 
of Serious Clinical Events 
RCA2: Improving Root 
Cause Analysis and 
Actions to Prevent Harm 




Not addressed Planned team response; 
information gathering 




medical record review, 
relevant policy and procedure 
review, create timeline 
Team performs 
investigation; caregivers 
directly involved are 
interviewed and asked for 
suggestions to prevent 
similar situations  
Include frontline staff to 
prevent blame and promote 
learning; interviews, 
gathering information, 
internal reporting about 
what happened; 
recommendations if 
external reporting is 
needed 
Begin within 72 hours of 
notification; fact finding, 
interviews, review of 
location, 
equipment/devices, etc., 
use triggering questions, 
involve patient and family 
when possible, develop 
timeline, flowchart 
Analysis Systems analysis 
(strategically not 
called root cause); 
identify care delivery 
problems and 
contributing factors 
Cause analysis, regression 
analysis, systems analysis all 
conducted by experts trained 
to identify causes 
Root cause analysis is 
common but others are 
acceptable 
Root cause, aggregated root 
cause in focus areas; 
includes actual and near 
miss events; caregivers 
directly involved are 
intentionally excluded from 
this stage for objectivity; 
root cause analysis should 
begin immediately and be 
complete within 45 days 
Root cause analysis 
performed by skilled/ 
trained person; should 
begin immediately and be 
completed within 30 days; 
should include patient, 
family and caregivers 
directly involved- extent of 
involvement should be 
case by case basis 
Use of tools such as cause 
and effect diagram and five 
why’s recommended, 
conducted by team; team 
does not include people 
directly involved in the 
event; should not strive to 
identify one root cause but 
instead should identify 
multiple factors, apply five 








formal sign off for 
completion, identify 
date to evaluate 
effectiveness, action 
items categorized by 




preventative strategies should 
be developed as soon as 
possible 
Action plan should be 
developed to focus on 
prevention of reoccurrence; 
metrics should be developed 
to measure and report events, 
effectiveness of actions and 
sustainability of changes 
Use actions to drive change, 
include human factors 
engineering 
Establish board 
accountability for long 
term systems solutions 
after each root cause to 
ensure resolution, learning 
and improvement to the 
organization safety 
Consider use of Veteran 
Administration’s action 
hierarchy to identify 
strength of actions; team 




and effectiveness with 









Recommended actions to be 
disseminated rapidly through 
reports, newsletters, normal 
communication channels 
Presentation of findings to 
leadership and board of 
directors; lessons learned 
shared locally, regionally or 
nationally depending on the 
organizational culture and 
whether or not there is 
pending litigation 
Alerts, newsletters, 
communications, stories of 
improvement across the 
system 
Multiple tools for internal 
and external 
communications 
Staff, patient and families 
should receive feedback 
Disclosure Not addressed Not addressed Information from analysis 
should be shared with patient 
and family face to face by a 
designated person/group 
Routine response to adverse 
events; detailed policy 
outlines procedures for this 
as VHA 
At the time of the event but 
also consider ongoing 
needs- use support, 
empathy, resolution and 
learning 
Not addressed here 





Systems Analysis of 
Clinical Incidents: 
The London Protocol 
WHO Draft Guidelines for 
Adverse Event Reporting 
and Learning Systems 
Serious Safety Events: 
Getting to Zero 
Patient Safety Handbook Respectful Management 
of Serious Clinical Events 
RCA2: Improving Root 
Cause Analysis and 
Actions to Prevent Harm 
Just Culture Separate event 
management from 
disciplinary 
procedures related to 
persistent performance 
issues by individuals; 
work to create open 
and just culture  
Healthcare workers who 
report events or safety issues 
should not be punished; 
reporter identification should 
not be disclosed to third 
parties 
Not addressed Non-punitive, systems 
approach; focus on 
prevention not punishment 
Based on James Reason’s 
work, must eliminate 
blame for learning and 
healing 
Do not involve people 
directly involved in the 
event in the analysis- only 
in the investigation and 






Alerts, safety reports, 
dissemination of lessons 
learned, common cause 
information should all be 
reported back to community 
of reporters routinely and 
rapidly 
Dissemination of findings 
should be shared based on 
organization culture and 
philosophy; state laws should 
be considered; standard 
metrics for consistent 
reporting should be used 
Involve all levels of staff in 
analysis, change and 
communication about 
events; improvement efforts 
are recognized locally and 
nationally; focus leadership 
on building trust and 
effective communication 
Involvement of front line 
workers; communication 
from to top down 
regarding what happened 
and what was learned 
Leadership oversight and 
measurement of the overall 
RCA process should occur; 
sample metrics provided 
 















Phase/ Project Step Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 
Team meeting 1 
Team meeting 2 
Define 
     Review of literature, evidence appraisal      
     Team established; executive support 
     Charter 
     SIPOC 
     Affinity diagram, voice of customer 
     Project communication plan 
Measure 
     Current State Process Map 
      
Team Meeting 3 
Team Meeting 4 
Measure 
     Current State Process Map continued 
     Data Collection related to baseline 
     Affinity Diagram, barriers to ideal process 
Analyze 
     Gap Analysis of literature and current state 
      
Team Meeting 5 
Team Meeting 6 
Improve 
     Solutions Grid 
     Future State Process Map 
     Implementation Plan 
     Communication Plan 
     Pilot Testing Period 
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Phase/ Project Step Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 
Team Meeting 7 
Team Meeting 8 
Improve 
     Pilot Testing Period 
     Results Evaluations 
Control 
      Recommendations 
     Control Plan 
     Replication Plan 
Celebration! 
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Table 3 




Health System Policy and/or Procedure Best Practice from Literature Review Changes 
Preparation & 
Planning 
 Improvement demonstrated through 
the AHRQ Culture of Safety Survey 
 Transparency improving but still have 
a conservative stance due to litigation 
exposure in Kentucky 
 Facility risk director holds primary 
responsibility versus formal team; 
other leaders are pulled in on a case 
by case basis; most events have some 
involvement of facility administrator, 
chief nursing officer and medical 
director where available and 
applicable 
 Events identified through Patient 
Safety Reporting System, Daily 
Safety Call and internal 
communication channels; are 
currently exploring surveillance tools 
such as trigger tools 
 Staff and leader engagement is 
improving but there is still 
opportunity 
 Create culture of safety with real 
transparencya 
 Form interdisciplinary team for 
immediate response with crisis 
intervention and planned response,a, b, c, 
d, e 
 Identify significant events through more 
ways than just voluntary reporting 
systemse 
 Engage all levels of leadership in safety 
improvementa, c, e 
 Engage all workforce in safety 
improvementa, d 




 Engagement of staff, 
providers and leaders 





Health System Policy and/or Procedure Best Practice from Literature Review Changes 
Investigation  Equal investigations performed for 
sentinel events and near misses but 
near misses of other adverse events 
may have a lower level investigation 
 Typically include best practice 
components including flow charts & 
timelines 
 Patient and family may not always be 
involved in the investigation if they 
do not request it or assert a complaint 
or claim 
 Caregivers involved are included in a 
respectful, non-punitive way 
 Investigations are sometimes delayed 
 Perform equal investigations for actual 
and near miss eventsc, e 
 Consider interviews, medical record 
reviews, equipment inspection, subject 
matter expert consultationa, b, c, d, e 
 Interview the patient/familya, e 
 Involve the caregivers directly involved 
in the event with respect and in a non-
punitive waya, c, d, e 
 Begin the investigation immediatelya, b, 
c, d, e 
 Use flow charts when possibleb, e 
 Develop a timeline/chronologyb, c, e 
 Job aide to ensure 
investigation is 
thorough and credible 
 Standardized work 
product  





Health System Policy and/or Procedure Best Practice from Literature Review Changes 
Analysis  Root and apparent cause analysis is 
typical; there is no standard use of 
aggregate reviews 
 Interdisciplinary team performs the 
analysis facilitated by the risk 
director; some team members are 
consistent across all analyses and 
others are pulled in on a case by case 
basis 
 Inconsistent methodologies used with 
the exception of The Joint 
Commission framework that is used 
for all sentinel events 
 Inconsistent methodologies/findings 
related to cause and contributing 
factors 
 Caregivers involved in the event are 
at the table during analysis 
 Patient and family are not included in 
the analysis but findings are 
sometimes shared 
 Timeline for completion varies 
 Internal communication of findings is 
inconsistent 
 Root cause analysis and aggregate 
reviewsa, b, c, d, e, f 
 Root cause analysis methodologies may 
include fishbone diagram, 5 whys and 
or The Joint Commission frameworka, b, 
c, d, e, f 
 Look for probable cause but also 
identify contributing factorsa, b, c, d, e, f 
 Findings should identify preceding 
causes to any human factorsf  
 Deference to expertise versus authorityd, 
e 
 Conflicting recommendations on 
whether to include the caregivers 
directly involved with the eventa, b, c, d, e 
 Conflicting recommendations on 
whether to include the patient/familya, e 
 Complete within 30-45 days of 
becoming aware of eventa, d, e 
 Communicate findings specifically to 
involved caregivers, front line 
staff/internally and to patient/familya, c, d, 
e, f 
 Communicate findings of aggregate 
reviews internallya, c, d, e, f 
 Provide formal 
training for meeting 
facilitators 
 Standardize tools 
 Standardize work 
product including 
summary sheet 









Health System Policy and/or Procedure Best Practice from Literature Review Changes 
Corrective Actions  Prioritization of causes and 
contributing factors occurs 
 Action items focus on prevention 
 Responsibility and timeframes for 
completion are assigned/established 
 Action items tend to remain at the 
local and facility level; analysis group 
is not empowered to assign system 
actions 
 Many action items are transient and 
focus on human factors; no standard 
process for ensuring long term 
solutions for every adverse event 
 Written policy requires a 
determination of how the action items 
are measured for effectiveness 
including consideration of quality 
measures; however, there is 
inconsistent follow through in 
practice 
 No standard process for monitoring 
organizational change 
 There are no standard metrics for 
measuring and reporting adverse 
events, action items or recurrence of 
events 
 Board of Trustees receives internal 
“Days Since” report that displays the 
number of days since an event that 
meet the National Quality Forum 
Serious Reportable Events criteria for 
each facility. At times, they receive 
limited information about why the 
event happened and what actions 
were recommended 
 Prioritize cause and contributing factors 
and link corrective actions to eachb, c, d, e 
 Focus action items on prevention of 
future eventsa, b, c, d, e 
 Assign responsibilitya, b, c, d, e 
 Establish timeframes for completiona, c, 
c, e 
 Consider assignment at the local/unit, 
facility and system levels for true 
organizational changeb, d, e 
 Consider actions based on feasibility, 
cost, resources needed, anticipated 
effectivenessc, d, e 
 Monitor for effectiveness and 
sustainability over timea, b, c, d, e 
 Develop metrics and standard 
reportingc, e 
 Board of Trustees should be 
accountable to long term system 
solutions for each root cause analysisa, e 
 Documentation in the 
patient safety 
reporting system 
 Standardize the 
process for tracking 
open action items 
 Involve executive 
sponsor in tracking 
 Create system to 
measure effectiveness 
of action items 





Health System Policy and/or Procedure Best Practice from Literature Review Changes 
Organizational 
Learning Strategies 
 Inconsistent feedback loop to 
reporters and front line workers 
regarding reporting and event 
management 
 No formal reporting incentives or 
consequences 
 Reporting is non-punitive but 
oversight of this is needed to sustain 
 Need to develop process for 
aggregate reviews with 
communication of findings 
 Opportunity around participatory 
management with event management 
 Opportunity to improve 
organizational culture and structure to 
use deference of expertise  
 Opportunity for standard 
dissemination of alerts, lessons 
learned and success stories related to 
organizational change 
 Create a feedback loop for patient safety 
event reporting for reporters and all 
front line staffa, c, d, e, f 
 Create incentives to reportc 
 Ensure reporting is non-punitivea, b, d, e, f 
 Communicate aggregate trends and 
related informationa, c, d, e, f 
 Use participatory management with 
analysis of events and corrective 
actionsc, d, e 
 Develop a feedback loop from analyses 
to those involved in the event, front line 
staff and all levels of leadershipa, c, d, e, f 
 Use a deference to expertise not 
authority during event managementd, e 
 Provide routine dissemination of 
lessons learned and changes made at the 
local/unit, facility and system levelsa, c, d, 
e, f 
 Generate alerts, newsletters, internal 
and external communications to share 
safety informationa, c, d, e, f 
 Event analysis 
summary sheet to be 
shared with people 
directly involved in 
the event and facility 
leaders 
 Summary sheets will 
be provided to system 
patient safety for 
shared learning 
 Designate resources 
for common cause 
analysis 
a“Respectful Management of Serious Clinical Events,” by J. Conway, F, Federico, K. Stewart, and M. Campbell, 2011. Retrieved 
from www.ihi.org 
 
b“Systems Analysis of Clinical Incidents: The London Protocol,” by S. Taylor-Adams and C. Vincent, 2001. Retrieved from 
www.imperial.ac.uk/ 
 
c“Serious Safety Events: Getting to Zero,” by M. Hoppes, J. L. Mitchell, E. G. Vendetti, and R. F. Bunting, 2012. Retrieved from 
www.ashrm.org 
 
d“Patient Safety Handbook,” 2011. Retrieved from www.patientsafety.va.gov 
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e“RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analysis and Actions to Prevent Harm,” by J. P. Bagian, D. Bonacum, J. DeRosier, J. Frost, R. J. 
Fairbanks, T. Ghandi, H. Haskell, P. McGaffin, and F. Sheppard, 2015. Retrieved from https://www.npsf.org/?page=RCA2 
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Table 4 
Sentinel Event Management Model and Toolkit Outline 
Learning Responses 
from Events* 
Sentinel Event Management Model & Toolkit Outline 
Identification Steps in Model: 
 Identification of event or potential event (system policy available) 
 Provide prompt and immediate care to patient and family 
 Contain risk of immediate recurrence 
 Initiate reporting and notification procedures (system policy available) 
 Preserve evidence 
 Conduct Meeting 1  
o Attendees: executive sponsor, operational director and manager, director of risk 
management, medical leadership and subject matter expert as needed  
o Purpose: ensure immediate mitigation of event is occurring or has occurred; ensure needs of 
the patient, family, staff and providers are being met; establish the known facts about the 
event and launch the investigation; and identify key people involved and how to contact 
them for interviews.  
o Timing: should occur as soon as possible after event identification and no later than 72 hours 
after notification.  
 Conduct the investigation which includes interviews of the people directly involved, collection of 
physical evidence, assessment of the environment, equipment and devices, review of medical 
records, review of policies and procedures, review of literature, and consultation with subject matter 
experts 
Tools available in Cause Analysis Toolkit: 
 Root Cause Analysis Process Map 
 Sentinel Event Response Checklist 
 Meeting 1 Checklist 
 Who What When (WWW) grid 
 Event Timeline Flow Chart 
 Causal Factor Fishbone 




Sentinel Event Management Model & Toolkit Outline 
Analysis Steps in Model: 
 Conduct Meeting 2 
o Attendees: the people who attended Meeting 1, peer representatives for the people directly 
involved in the event, and subject matter experts as needed. The executive sponsor sends the 
invitation to the meeting using a standard template.  
o Purpose: to analyze the event to validate what happened and determine how and why the 
event happened. This involves identifying causal and contributing factors.  
o Home work is assigned to some attendees to research literature and professional practices 
standards related to the causal factors and prevention of recurrence. 
o Timing: should take place when the investigation is complete and no later than 30 days after 
notification of the event 
Tools available Cause Analysis Toolkit: 
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 2 Invitation Template 
 Event timeline flowchart 
 Cause Analysis Sign In Sheet 
 Causal Testing Worksheet 
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 2 Talking Points 
 Causal Factor Fishbone 
 Root Cause Review Homework Assignment Sheet 




Sentinel Event Management Model & Toolkit Outline 
Change Steps in Model 
 Conduct Meeting 3 
o Attendees: the people who attended Meeting 2, quality improvement and subject matter 
experts as needed. The executive sponsor sends the invitation to the meeting using a standard 
template.  
o Purpose: to develop an evidence-based action plan to prevent recurrence of a similar event or 
decrease the likelihood of patient harm if the event does recur.  
o Timing: should take place within 1-2 weeks of Meeting 2 and no later than 45 days after 
notification of the event.  
o Action items are specific, assigned to an owner, include a deadline, are tracked to completion 
and measured for effectiveness. Strength of actions are considered by the team. 
 A Root Cause Analysis summary sheet is completed that includes the event description, causal 
factors, key lesson learned and action plan. This is shared with the people directly involved as a 
feedback loop and shared with others in the healthcare system for organizational learning. 
Tools available in Cause Analysis Toolkit: 
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 3 Invitation Template 
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 3 Talking Points 
 Cause Analysis Sign In Sheet 
 WWW grid 
 Action Plan 
 Root Cause Analysis Summary Sheet 
 
Note. *”Learning from Patient Safety Incidents: Creating Participative Risk Regulation in Healthcare,” by C. Macrae, 2008, Health, 
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Table 5 
Sentinel Event Management Model Audit Sheet 
Date of Event:     PSRS #: 
Auditor:     Date of Audit: 
Key Element of Model Completed YES Completed NO Comments 
Meeting 1: 
Y = occurred within timeframe and achieved desired 
outcome including standard tools and documentation 
   
Investigation completed before Meeting 2 and flow chart 
prepared 
   
Meeting 2 invitation template used    
Meeting 2: 
Y = occurred within timeframe and achieved desired 
outcome including standard tools and documentation 
   
Assignments made to research solutions before Meeting 3    
Meeting 3 invitation template used    
Meeting 3: 
occurred within timeframe and achieved desired outcome 
including standard tools and documentation 
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Table 6 








Benchmark Target Goal 
Percentage of sentinel 
events managed using 
the standard event 
management model 
(process) 
Numerator = number 
of sentinel events that 
were managed using 
the standard event 
management model  
 
Denominator = 
number of sentinel 
events that were 





management model is 
strongly desired and 
evidence-based to 
improve overall 
culture of safety 
Sentinel event report 
will be produced from 
reporting system; 
events that did not have 
all of the steps of the 
standard process 
completed due to the 
time limitations of the 
pilot testing period will 
be excluded 
No baseline or 
benchmark available; 
event management was 
not previously 
measured by the 
hospital or health 
system 
100% 
Percentage of event 
summary sheets used 
for facility or system 
feedback loop 
(process) 
Numerator = number 
of sentinel event 
summary sheets used 




number of sentinel 
events included in the 
audit for the 
percentage of sentinel 
events managed 
using the standard 
model 
This is a high 
reliability principle 
that is key to 
organizational learning 
to prevent future 
occurrences of similar 
events 
Sentinel event report 
will be produced from 
reporting system; 
sentinel events included 
in the audit for use of 
standard event 
management will be 
audited specifically for 
use of the event 
summary sheet  
No benchmark or 
baseline available; 
event summary sheets 
not used in the past 
100% 









Benchmark Target Goal 
Sentinel Event Rate 
(outcome) 
Number of reported 
sentinel events per 
1,000 patient days  
Decrease in sentinel 
events over time is 
desired 
Sentinel event report 
will be produced from 
patient safety reporting 
system; patient days 
will be obtained from 
Finance department 
reports. Chart will be 
produced to 
demonstrate baseline 
rate, dates of 
implementation of 
standard event 
management model at 
each acute care facility, 
and rates during testing 
periods 
Due to the change of 
definition of sentinel 
event by The Joint 
Commission on January 
1, 2015, the 2015 data 
will be used as a 
baseline. This rate will 
be monitored long term 
20% decrease each year 
post model 
implementation; 
consideration will be given 
to the fact that typically the 
rate goes up due to 
increased education, 
awareness, and focus 
before it comes down due 


























Project PI team 
 
Project leader time 
 
Patient safety reporting 
system administrator time 
 
Education and Training time 
for risk management 
department 
 
In house legal time for 
applicable P&P revision and 
consulting related to patient 
safety work product 
 
Complete literature search 
and evidence appraisal 
 
Conduct current policy and 
procedure review 
 
Perform gap analysis between 




improvement (PI) team 
 
Perform PI using DMAIC PI 
model 
 
Revise policies and 
procedures 
 
Education and training related 
to standard sentinel event 
management model to risk 
management department 
Standard taxonomy related to 
sentinel events and related 
policies and procedures 
 




corrective action and 
organization learning after 
sentinel events 
 




Evidence-based policies and 




learning after sentinel events 
 
LTG: 
Decreased sentinel events 
 
Decreased costs related to 
non-reimbursable care 
 
Decreased costs related to 
claims and litigation 
associated with sentinel 
events 
 
Improved compliance with 
accreditation standards 
associated with sentinel event 
management 
Prevention of sentinel events 
 
Improved culture of safety 
 




learning after sentinel events 
to decrease the likelihood of 
recurrence 
 
Improved communication and 
awareness around sentinel 
events to senior leaders and 
board of trustees 
 
Decreased costs from non-
reimbursable care associated 
with sentinel events 
 
Consistent compliance with 
accreditation standards 
associated with sentinel event 
management 














Goal Target Reaction/ 
Response 



























Run reports in 
PSRS; audit 100% 
for first 60 days 
post 
implementation 
of model, then 
50%   
























PSRS reports Facility and 
system, level 













of action plan 






















on or before 
deadline 













data; run PSRS 
reports and 
calculate 


















































visits to produce 





























































Report of cause 
analyses will be 
run in PSRS and 
events will be 
selected for 
audit. Audit will 
be conducted 
using modified 
TJC RCA checklist 
85% for 6 
months; then 
100% 
If goal not 
met, 
improvement 












What Action Will Be Taken? 
Resolution/Tasks 
(Use a separate line for each 
task) 
Assign Responsibility: 
Name of Individual 








How Will You Know 




Establish system wide timeline      
Communication Plan for 
stakeholders 
     
Final revisions to Toolkit and 
place on intranet 
     
For Each Facility:      
Establish Guiding Team      
Create shared change vision 
and strategy 
     
Develop communication Plan      
Complete gap analysis of 
current state to new process 
     
Complete barriers affinity 
diagram 
     
Develop implementation plan 
and timeline 
     
Develop education plan      
Establish go live date      
Implement system control plan      
 
